

"As regards the telegraphs, it is sometimes said that though we have paid dearly for it, at any rate we have a more effective system. This is, of course, a matter of opinion, but I doubt it. My belief is that competition would have given us a better system. This cannot be proved, but I may give an illustration . . ."

The papers on education derive interest from Lord Avebury's position on three commissions and in the University of London, and form a strong and convincing argument in favour of the increased attention to science which we may hope is gradually finding place; they are marked by the aptly selected quotations for which readers of "The Pleasures of Life" are prepared.

When a writer publishes essays on so wide a range of subjects, he deliberately invites criticism; and, indeed, readers of this volume will ask in several cases whether this or that address was worth printing. But if the papers are not taken too seriously, much will be found of interest, if little that is new. The book resembles the modern daily paper in many other respects; there is a wide range of ideas, something for everybody, much hasty writing, and frequent repetition of the same items in different guises.

IN SEARCH OF TRUTH.

Humanism: Philosophical Essays. By F. C. S. Schiller, M.A. Pp. xxvii+297. (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1903.) Price 8s. 6d. net.

Ueber die Grenzen der Gewissheit. By Dr. Ernst Dürr. Pp. vii+152. (Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1903.) Price 3.50 marks.

Tat und Wahrheit. Eine Grundfrage der Geisteswissenschaft. By Hans von Lüpke. Pp. 35. (Leipzig: Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1903.) Price 50 pf.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series. Vol. iii. (London: Williams and Norgate, 1903.) Price 10s. 6d.

THE collection of articles and addresses presented in Mr. Schiller's volume exhibits all the characteristics familiar to readers of his previous work. Paradox is, of course, not wanting; humour enlivens discussion, not shrinking from the antithesis of "comic" and "cosmic," or such a phrase as "ponderous pondering"; philosophy, literary criticism, and the Psychological Research Society are duly represented. Mr. Schiller's style incurs one great disadvantage: it sometimes leaves the reader in doubt whether the matter is really to be taken seriously; perhaps this is why Mr. Schiller has still to complain that philosophers neglect his imperatives.

The keynote to the book is pragmatism, and the essays here collected may claim the unity of this one theme. The parts vary considerably both in quality and subject. The essay in literary criticism, "Concerning Mephistopheles," may claim a first place; it is interesting, novel and lucid, in short, our author at his best. The first eight essays, dealing with some of the most vexed questions of philosophy, have common

characteristics and equal value. Mr. Schiller triumphs in destructive criticism; the common-sense element of pragmatism is, in his hands, a powerful weapon against extravagances not unknown in recent philosophy; pragmatism is thus justified as a tonic; if we object that man does not live by tonics, we are again victims of a triumph, for a collection of essays is not a system and not open to a systematic criticism. The essay on "Reality and 'Idealism'" illustrates the first point; for the second, let the dialogue on "Useless Knowledge" plead its occupancy of space. One of the most satisfactory essays is "Darwinism and Design," and "Pessimism" is a subject which, directly and indirectly, inspires some of the best passages in the book. The closing sections on "Immortality" would call for no remark except that such a subject too often attracts the uncritical; even they will probably think Mr. Schiller's concept of "spirit" might have been definitely explained, while his admission that the "state after death" does not form a part of the experience of any subject in the sense that "real" and "dream" states do, might well have excused not a few of the closing pages. One thing more is also a desideratum: that concept of "purpose" on which pragmatism bases its claim to rejuvenate philosophy must be elaborated; for this we wait, not without fasting, taking the present contribution as earnest of the systematic exposition which the introduction seems to promise.

As the title denotes, Dr. Dürr's book deals with the question of boundaries, consequently it is critical rather than constructive, negative rather than positive. The central problem is, How much may be called certain? and, from the author's point of view, the immediately given is alone fully certain. The immediately given is the psychological actuality. But we cannot rest in this; problems arise which compel us to make distinctions; even consistency cannot ensure "reality," for dreams may be consistent and yet life is more than a dream.

It appears then that the necessity of the immediately given coexists with a necessity for that which is not immediately given, but that which is not immediately given has not certainty—it is the object of belief and is not justified by any formal logical proof, but by the worth which attaches to our conception of it. Realism, for example, is without proof, but it is right as against anti-realism by virtue of its superior value as a basis for science.

Having thus found belief at the very roots of science we may consider some belief to have some certainty; we may further show that other beliefs, ethical and metaphysical, are not less certain than this scientific belief, and with that the limit of our author's work is reached. The result is a defence of belief against some, and only some, attacks. It might be objected that the ethical belief cannot be defended by proving it not less valuable than the scientific belief without giving the concept of value an ambiguous significance. The preliminary discussions on "Erkenntnistheorie" and the question of a "Kriterium" contain much interesting criticism; but the subsequent justification of belief seems built on inadequate foundations.

The subject of Herr Lüpke's little book is the significance of genius; the basis from which the subject is developed is the work of Eugen Kühnemann. The exposition of Kühnemann's importance is combined with original suggestions, but the author admits that no exact distinction between these parts can be made. The point selected for emphasis is the method adopted by Kühnemann of studying thought in a concrete way; to understand a thinker we must study the life-history of his thought, exposing the soil and climate of its growth. This scientific analysis has been applied by Kühnemann in his works on Socrates and Herder. The result is a more adequate recognition of personality as the object of *Geisteswissenschaft* and a clearer idea of the meaning of personality. From this certain deductions follow. Genius means the ability adequately to express oneself; it implies a penetration into the very depths of our own being—and, consequently, a power to reach the depths common to all humanity. In both aspects, whether of the method by which we interpret the thought or of the manner in which the thought expresses the being of the thinker, it is equally true to say that thus the word becomes flesh.

The author is here very much in touch with the significance which recent writers in Germany give to the term "*Geisteswissenschaft*." He has a further interest in relating this movement to theology and the progress of scientific theology. The point that in the life of genius the word becomes flesh, indicates the direction in which we are to look for the expected development. The author makes the noteworthy remark that the battle for a God is not to be fought in the sphere of natural science, but in this study of personality. Though brief, the essay is singularly suggestive.

The published proceedings of the Aristotelian Society are always of considerable interest. If comparison is permitted, the contributions to this number seem more than usually interesting, while the whole series is pervaded with an atmosphere of life and activity. The first paper is an able criticism of "Mr. Bradley's Theory of Judgment" by Prof. Stout, whose work Dr. Bosanquet rightly says is "always thorough and of the highest scientific quality." The essay on "The Logic of Pragmatism" (Henry Sturt) is a timely contribution on a subject that at present stands in some need of complete exposition. Prof. Latta's treatment of "The Significance of the Sub-conscious" is a distinctly helpful contribution, marked by a lucidity too rarely associated with his subject; a little infusion of this same quality would have achieved something toward making the contribution of another writer ("Experience and Empiricism") more intelligible.

In all there are eight papers, and all are worth reading. In view of the quality of the work, it seems a pity that the Society should have to record a decrease in membership. This is certainly "matter for regret," and however much the spirit of the times is opposed to the speculative life, there must be many students of philosophy who do not support the Society; to such this volume should be an eloquent proof of the advantages of cooperation in the search after truth. G. S. B.

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PEAKS AND PASSES OF GREECE.

Vacation Days in Greece. By Rufus B. Richardson, formerly Director of the American School of Archaeology, Athens. Pp. xiii + 240; illustrated. (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1903.) Price 7s. 6d.

THE genial personality of the late director of the American School at Athens is known to everyone who has made any long stay in the capital of Greece during the past five years and more. No foreign resident, except, perhaps, Dr. Dörpfeld, had wider personal knowledge of the Hellenic peninsula than Mr. Richardson. Certainly none had pushed a bicycle over so many stony passes, or scaled half as many storied peaks. He made mountain-climbing a speciality of the American School, so much so that climbing of all kinds became a passion of the students; and while one risked life and limb on the Acropolis precipice to rediscover inscriptions once read by Wordsworth in the face of the Kimonian walls, another swung himself over the eastern pediment of the Parthenon to decipher by the print of the nails the dedication whereby a Roman emperor had aspired to appropriate the credit of the temple. In the pleasant volume before us Mr. Richardson describes two ascents, those of the highest peaks of Taygetus and Kióna, the less known twin of Parnassus, which overtops by about two hundred feet all other summits on Greek soil. But he alludes to many others, *e.g.* those of Parnassus itself and Aroania, and probably, with the exception of Tsumerka and the Pindus peaks, which are as much in Turkey as Greece, he has stood on every one of the mountain giants of free Hellas.

Despite Mr. Richardson's enthusiasm for the bicycle, few visitors, we suspect, will be convinced that it is the best vehicle for touring about Greece. A comparatively freshly laid road in the Hellenic kingdom is good enough, but very few are freshly laid, and an old road can be appalling. Then there are the dogs, and the impossibility of obtaining skilled surgery for the wheel outside Athens itself, and the chance of an occasional row with some rustic, whose dog you have had to stone, or whose mule has stampeded at sight of you. Nevertheless, given a light and inexpensive American machine, one may certainly get over most unpromising ground with it, and cover great distances in the day, freed from the intolerable irksomeness of sitting a Greek baggage-animal. Mr. Richardson's account of his three days' run from Athens to Thessaly is exhilarating reading; but did he really see Olympus from Cithaeron? Was it not rather some snowy part of Othrys or Pindus? The interval, from the point on which he was standing, to the seat of the gods, is not less than one hundred and fifty miles as the crow flies, and there are many intervening heights.

Mr. Richardson is careful to suppress archæological "shop," and to preserve the holiday atmosphere. Therefore, although he gives a glimpse of M. Kabbadias at work at Epidaurus, and alludes to the French excavations at Delphi, his own at Corinth, and others, his book is to be read, not for its information about these, nor, indeed, for scientific information of